The European Court of Human Rights' (ECtHR) use of the margin of appreciation (MoA) in cases concerning religious clothing is well-documented. This article paints a more complete picture of the
Introduction
In the Kokkinakis decision, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) accepted that in the context of Article 9 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 1 'a certain margin of appreciation is to be left to the Contracting States in assessing the existence and extent of sought to strike a balance between Article 9 ECHR and a competing right or collective goal.
10
It may also refer to the interpretation or application of rights at a domestic level. 11 In contrast, the systemic MoA recognises the limitations of the ECtHR's powers of review and results in deference to States on the basis of 'a functional or pragmatic rationale related to the different competences of different actors in the European system for the protection of human rights'. 12 Thus, Letsas understands the structural MoA as being rooted in State sovereignty and the principle that the ECtHR must not act as a Court of Fourth Instance. 13 The boundaries between these two formulations of the MoA are not clear 14 
Reconciling the Interests of Various Religious Groups
In Kokkinakis, the ECtHR accepted that 'in democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within one and the same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on this 
Reconciling a Clash between Individual Religious Freedom and 'the Rights and

Freedoms of Others' or Other Societal Goals
In addition to recognising that States have a MoA to reconcile the claims of various religious groups, the ECtHR has accepted that 'regard must be had in particular to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole, subject in any event to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State'. 41 Thus, 'various concessions on the part of individuals or groups' may be necessary 'to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society'. 42 Interference with the right to manifest religion in order to protect 'the rights and freedoms of others' falls within the scope of Article 9(2) ECHR. The normative MoA in this context permits States to determine the appropriate weight to be afforded to competing interests. The ECtHR has, nonetheless, adopted a narrower MoA in cases concerning the protection of freedom of religion or belief when the State has failed to comply with its positive obligation to secure the rights contained in the Convention. 76 Thus, although in
Karaahmed v Bulgaria the ECtHR accepted that the State had a wide MoA in relation to
'operational matters' pertaining to policing, the failure of the police to prevent demonstrators from interfering with religious worship meant than the State had not struck an appropriate balance between the rights of protesters and Article 9 ECHR. 77 Thus, it appears that in cases concerning politically sensitive issues, the ECtHR uses the systemic MoA (on the basis of democracy or democratic principles such as secularism) to avoid scutinising the legitimacy of the interference with the individual applicant's religious freedom. In contrast, the level of expertise of the national authorities does not always give rise to the same level of discretion, if the State has failed to comply with its positive obligations. While in the context of hospitals and planning permission the ECtHR has prisons, the State has a positive obligation to secure the rights in the Convention and, thus, the MoA appears to be narrower.
Conclusion
The ECtHR has consistently recognised that States have a MoA in cases concerning the right to manifest religion. Under the normative MoA, the ECtHR usually scrutinises the necessity of the interference with the applicant's rights. Thus, although it allows States some discretion to decide whether an appropriate balance has been struck between individual freedoms and 'the rights and freedoms of others' or other societal goals, this discretion is not absolute. The use of the MoA in these cases does not always appear to be strictly necessary, as the ECtHR already allows States discretion when analysing the proportionality of the restriction under Article 9(2) ECHR.
In contrast, the systemic MoA appears to be much wider. In cases concerning secularism, democracy and the expertise of national authorities, the ECtHR has frequently approached the justification for the restriction on the applicant's rights as unproblematic. This precludes it from considering whether 'hostile-external preferences' 78 are at play. This level of deference has the potential to be particularly problematic in instances where the religious freedom of unpopular minorities is limited.
78 Letsas, supra note 11, p. 729.
